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NAFTA AND THE NEW MEXICAN PRESIDENCY*
Ewell E. Murphy, Jr.t
THE ANNUAL HENRY T. KING JR. ADDRESS ON NORTH




I. Three Pressing Problems
When Felipe Calder6n looks at Mexico from the window of his
presidential office, he sees three pressing problems he must solve.
The immediate problem is the disputed legitimacy of his election. The
electoral tribunal declared him winner,1 but the opposition claimed fraud;
they blocked Mexico City's main avenue with protests, met massively in the
central square, and proclaimed Andrds Manuel L6pez Obrador as the duly
elected President. Their fury was so great that Calder6n could be sworn into
office only by entering the Chamber of Deputies through a back door and
slipping out again after a four-minute ceremony interrupted by catcalls from
the opposition. To be an effective president of Mexico, Calder6n must earn
the support of more Mexicans.
Even if Calder6n earns that support, a continuing problem is the party
make-up of Mexico's newly elected national Congress. In each house,
Copyright 2007 by Ewell E. Murphy, Jr. All rights reserved.
Remarks occurred at an event entitled The Annual Henry T. King Jr. Address on
Northern American Relations before the Greater Cleveland International Lawyers' Group,
held on January 23, 2007.
1 B.A., LL.B., University of Texas at Austin; D.Phil., Oxford University, England. Mr.
Murphy is a retired senior partner in Houston of the law firm of Baker Botts, L.L.P. and a
Distinguished Lecturer at the University of Houston Law Center.
1 As certified, the votes were 35.9% for Felipe Calder6n, 35.3% for Andrds Manuel L6pez
Obrador, and 22.2% for Roberto Madrazo. A Survey of Mexico, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 2006, at
4 [hereinafter Survey].
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Calder6n's party has only a plurality, less than L6pez Obrador's party plus a
significant third.2 Unless Calder6n can gather other-party votes for major
projects, his legislative initiatives will be doomed from the start.
Beyond those problems of public and Congressional support looms the
third problem, Mexico itself. Mexico is the world's most populous Spanish-
speaking country, 3 with more than 107 million people,4 and Mexico is well-
endowed with natural resources, but for most of those people Mexico's
resources have produced only marginal and unevenly distributed gain. The
richest 10% of Mexicans own 45% of all wealth; the poorest 10% have only
1.6%. 5 Half of the population lives in poverty, surviving on less than four
dollars a day.6 Twelve million Mexican families scrounge at makeshift jobs
in the "informal economy.",
7
That economic disparity breeds waves of resentment against the
governing class. Recent surges were the Zapatista insurrection in Chiapas,
the civic rebellion in Oaxaca, and the anti-Calder6n demonstrations in
Mexico City. The disparity also breeds crime and corruption, which discredit
government itself. To be an effective president, Calder6n must move Mexico
into greater and more equally shared prosperity.
II. Three Key Issues
When President Calder6n looks at Mexico, those are the problems he
sees. But Mexican presidents must look at more than Mexico. An earlier
Mexican president said it famously: "Pobre Mexico, tan lejos de Dios y tan
cerca de los Estados Unidos." "Poor Mexico, so far from God and so near to
the United States."8 Calder6n must look north; he must deal with issues that
involve Mexico and the United States.
When President Calder6n looks north, he sees three key issues. By
provision or omission, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
brackets each of those issues.
2 Id. at 5. Chamber of Deputies: Partido Acci6n Nacional (PAN), 206; coalition of Partido
de la Revoluci6n Democrdtica (PRD), 159; Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), 122;
others 13. Senate: PAN, 52; PRI, 39; PRD, 36; other, 1.
3 Id. at 3.
4 Recently estimated at 107.5 million. George Grayson, In Mexico, whoever wins faces
the same problems, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 5, 2006, at 13.
5 Losing Presidential Candidate Lopez Obrador May be Squandering His Chance to
Empower Mexico's Poor, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 22, 2006, at B8.
6 id.
7 Richard Lapper, Special Report: Mexico and Infrastructure, FIN. TIMES, Jun. 21, 2006,
at 2.
8 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (5th ed. 1999) (quoting President Portfirio
Diaz).
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A. Immigration
The first key issue is immigration. By one estimate there are 11 million
illegal aliens in the United States, of which some 6.3 million are Mexicans. 9
Of the 1 million people who enter illegally through the Mexican border each
year, half are Mexicans and the rest are mainly from Central and South
America.' 0 About 9% of Mexico's citizens live in the United States, and
about half of Mexican-born U.S. residents are illegal aliens."
The last concerted U.S. response to that problem was a 1986 law that
legalized nearly 3 million illegals and increased penalties against employers
who hire illegals. Until recently the enforcement of those employer penalties
has been lax. As the problem deepened, the U.S. Congress dithered. Finally,
in December 2005, the House passed a bill to criminalize all illegals. In May
2006, the Senate countered with a bill to legalize most current illegals and to
establish a guest worker and citizenship track for others. Reconciling those
seemingly irreconcilable bills is a priority task of the new U.S. Congress of
2007.12
Understandably, Mexico favors amnesty and guest worker access. In
meetings with President Bush, Calder6n's predecessor urged those solutions.
In campaign speeches and post-election statements, Calder6n has continued
that advocacy. But the U.S. Congress must decide, and the friendship of
future Mexico-U.S. relations hangs on the tone and substance of that
decision. If Mexico sees U.S. immigration policy as a disdainful rejection of
Mexicans, President Calder6n will be politically obliged to distance himself
from the United States, with resulting harm to both sides.
On that immigration issue, NAFTA is almost silent. Regarding the
movement of persons between NAFTA countries, NAFTA requires only
temporary access for specified categories of "business persons;"'13 it speaks
not a word on the more sensitive subjects of guest workers and illegal aliens.
B. Energy
The second key issue involving Mexico and the United States is energy. It
has two dimensions, transnational and national. Its transnational dimension -
9 Survey, supra note 1, at 15.
10 Id. at 16.
11 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND
CHALLENGES 453 (Institute for International Economics, 2005).12 For a comparison of the bills, see Jim Rutenberg, Border Fight Divides Party, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2006, at Al.
13 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex, ch. 16, arts 1601-1603, Oct. 7,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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the right to restrict the movement of energy products across the Mexico-U.S.
border - is a milestone of the past. Its national dimension - the future of
Mexico's energy industry - is an on-going debate among Mexicans
themselves.
1. Transnational
The transnational dimension of the energy issue has roots in the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1989. When that agreement was negotiated
the United States was already a substantial net importer of energy products
from Canada, but Canada and the United States were also parties to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATTF), and the GATT authorizes
an exporting GATT country to restrict exports for many reasons - for
example, to keep home prices down,14 to relieve "critical shortages" of
"essential" products, 15 to conserve "exhaustible natural resources,"' 16 and to
distribute products that are in "local short supply."
17
Those GATT export restriction rights worried the U.S. negotiators. What
will happen to U.S. energy needs, they wondered, if Canada invokes its
GATT rights and shuts off the tap? The U.S. negotiators proposed reciprocal
waivers, and the Canadians agreed, so the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement provided that neither country would use its GATT export
restriction rights to fix export prices higher than domestic prices, to disrupt
"normal proportions" or "normal channels of supply," or to reduce exports
disproportionately to recent patterns.
That settled the transnational energy issue between Canada and the United
States, but the issue erupted again when the Canada-U.S. Agreement was
expanded to become NAFTA. Those negotiations introduced a new team of
negotiators who gave in, but only to Mexico. So NAFTA creates an odd
disparity of energy export rights among the three NAFTA countries. Between
Canada and the United States, their old two-way waivers remain,18 but
between each of them and Mexico, Mexico waives nothing. 19 So Mexico
retains its GATT rights to shut off the tap.
A later Prime Minister of Canada objected to Canada's waiver and
published a declaration against it, 20 but in the unamended language of
NAFTA, that odd disparity remains to this day.
14 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, § III art. XX(i), Jan. 1 1948, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
15 Id. at art. XI(2)(a).
16 Id. at art. XX(g).
17 Id. at art. XX(j).
18 NAFTA, supra note 13, at ch. 3, art. 315.
19 Id. at annex 315.
20 Declaration of Prime Minister Jean Chritien, CAN. GAZETrE, Pt. 1, Vol. 128, No. 1,
[Vol. 33 No. 2]
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2. National
The national dimension of the energy issue is not a wrangle of trade
negotiators. It is a fundamental disagreement among Mexicans themselves
about how the energy resources of Mexico should be developed. In its
significance for the United States and NAFTA, that issue is not merely a
milestone of the past. It is a volcano of the present that may explode
destructively, may be channeled productively, or may quietly simmer into
irrelevance.
A flashback through history explains the prominence of the national
energy issue in the Mexican mind:
21
" Foreign investment in Mexican energy began under a mining
law of 1884 and a petroleum law of 1901, both of which
allowed private ownership.
* In 1910 came the Revolution. Its new Constitution of 1917
declared subsurface minerals to be the inalienable property of
the Mexican nation, but after much contention, investors were
allowed to keep concessions previously granted.
* The result was a thriving Mexican oil industry. By 1921
Mexico was producing one-fourth of the world's oil.
* Then the fateful blow. In 1938 President Cdrdenas
expropriated private oil companies and created Pemex, the
state oil and gas monopoly. A 1958 statute confirmed that
Pemex could pay private contractors only in money, not in
reserves or percentages of production.
* In 1960 President L6pez Mateos nationalized the private
electricity industry by contractual buy-out, and, to operate that
industry, created another state monopoly.
To many Mexicans, that history reads like an anthem of liberation from
imperialistic foreign capitalism. They celebrate the oil expropriation with a
beautiful Mexico City monument and an annual national holiday. Their battle
Jan. 1, 1994.
21 Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Prospect for Further Energy Privatization in Mexico, 36 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 75, 77-78 (2001) (discussing the general history of Mexico's national energy issue).
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cry is the slogan of the expropriation: "El petrrleo es nuestro." "The oil is
ours." Because of that history and those feelings, at Mexico's insistence
NAFTA explicitly preserves Mexico's right to exclude foreign energy
22investment and to maintain Mexico's state energy monopolies.
Nonetheless, there is another side to Mexico's national energy debate, and
that side argues that Mexico's energy future needs private investment.
Commencing in the 1990s, every Mexican president has tried to persuade the
Mexican Congress to reduce the scope of the state monopolies.23 Thus,
President Salinas limited the electricity monopoly to "public service," and
President Zedillo carved out private sectors of transportation and distribution
of natural gas. President Fox unsuccessfully lobbied for private generation
and sale of electricity generally. 24 So far, President Calder6n has spoken
cautiously. He said he will welcome foreign investment in permitted energy
areas, 25 but will be "very respectful of national legislation ... which doesn't
permit foreign investment in petroleum extraction.',
26
So at this point in history, as the world is clamoring for energy supplies
and the price of oil zig-zags at record heights, Mexico's energy industry is
shrinking. The figures are almost unbelievable. Mexico is actually a
significant net importer of natural gas and refined oil from the United
States, 27 importing 23% of all the natural gas and 30% of all the gasoline that
Mexico consumes.28 Last year Mexico imported $7.8 billion worth of
petrochemicals. 29 The picture is even worse than that. Sixty percent of
Mexico's oil comes from a single offshore field of rapidly declining
production.30 In the words of a recent study, Mexico may become "a net
energy importer by the end of the decade. 31
Why doesn't Pemex come to Mexico's rescue, finding and developing
more oil and gas, building more refineries and petrochemical plants, and
becoming a world-class energy operator both in Mexico and abroad? Pemex
has enough people to do it - with about 140,000 of them, 32 it is the largest
22 See NAFTA, supra note 13, at ch. 11 art. 1108. See also NAFTA, supra note 13, at
annex III-Mexico, sec. A.
23 See Murphy, supra note 21, at 77.
24 Mexico Workers Object to Power Sector Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at C4.
25 See generally Marion Lloyd, Changing of the Guard in Mexico, HouS. CHRON., Dec. 2,
2006 at A30.
26 Dudley Althaus, Energy, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 1, 2006, at D1.
27 HUFBAUER & ScHIor, supra note 11, at 419.
28 Survey, supra note 1, at 12.
29 World Business Briefing Americas: Pemex to Increase Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2006, at C10.
30 Althaus, supra note 26.
31 HUFBAUER & SCHOTF, supra note 11, at 23.
32 Id. at 404.
[Vol. 33 No. 2]
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corporate employer in Mexico.33 It has enough constitutional authority and
certainly enough revenues.
There's the rub. The Mexican government uses Pemex as a cash cow.
Every year, the Mexican government appropriates about 60% of Pemex's
gross revenues, 34 frequently leaving Pemex at a net annual loss.35 Those
appropriated Pemex revenues constitute more than one-third of all the
revenues of the Mexican government.36 For Mexican taxpayers, that is a
blessing; it keeps their taxes down to less than 12% of GDP, a good two
points below the Latin American average and less than a third of the average
of OECD countries.37 But for the energy future of Mexico, that annual
appropriation of Pemex revenues is a curse.
And, for the joined economy of the NAFTA countries, it is an opportunity
lamentably lost. Our energy world is a trauma of radical change. Old
production is dwindling; new exploration prospects are hard to find; state-
owned oil companies are jousting and ousting private companies in the
global arena; oil-importing countries are burdened by cartel prices; and
above the turmoil sounds the prediction that oil and gas energy will become a
power of the past, that alternatives, renewables, and nuclear are the future.
Acting together, the three NAFrA countries could deal shrewdly and
profitably with the world's traumatic energy change. More than any other
neighboring group, in the aggregate these three countries can muster the
money, the markets, the technologies, the operational and entrepreneurial
skills, and much of the energy-producing potential of a winning coalition.
The challenge is creating that coalition in a way that all three countries
politically accept.
Without more popular and Congressional support, President Calder6n
may not be able to cause Mexico to grasp its energy opportunity. In the
words of one analysis, "Basically, Mexico has three choices: find tax
revenues elsewhere and allow Pemex to reinvest its financial surplus in
exploration and development; invite private energy producers into Mexico to
drill for oil and gas; or slide into the ranks of energy-importing countries. 38
Of those three choices, Mexico's sad destiny may be choice number three.
If Mexico chooses that destiny, it will be sad for the United States as well.
Currently 80% of Mexico's crude oil production is exported to the United
33 Elisabeth Malkin, Mexican Oil Chief Sees Expansion, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 2, 2005, at C8.
34 HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 11, at 404-05.
35 Around the World: Mexico City, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 1, 2005, at D10; James C.
McKinley & Elisabeth Malkin, Accidents Reveal Troubles at Mexico's Oil Monopoly, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2005, at A17; & David Luhnow, Over a Barrel: As Mexico's Oil Giant
Struggles, its Laws Block Foreign Help, WALL ST. J., Jun. 15, 2005, at Al.
36 Survey, supra note 1, at 10.
" See id.
38 HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 11, at 60.
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States. 39 That amounts to one-sixth of all U.S. crude oil imports,4° making
Mexico "the United States' second largest source of foreign oil.' ' To the
extent that Mexico loses the ability to export crude oil to the United States,
the United States will become more dependent on less friendly, and less
reliable, sources.
C. NAFTA's Final Opening
The third key issue involving Mexico and the United States is whether
NAFTA should be amended to delay, for some goods, NAFTA's final trade
opening.
When countries agree to trade freely with each other, they don't say,
"Okay, we'll open up tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock." It's much more
complicated than that. They open up gradually, one group of exports at a
time, following lists called "staging categories." Final trade opening takes a
long time, and those "staging categories" are carefully crafted to leave the
most problematic goods for the very end.
When Canada and the United States made their 1989 free trade
agreement, they set their final trade opening for January 1, 1998. They
accomplished that right on target, problematic goods and all. NAFTA's final
trade opening is set for January 1, 2008, but, for Mexico, zero-tariff access
for some last-stage U.S. agricultural goods is very problematic.
The underlying economic fact is that NAFTA is an attempt to create an
integrated North American economy among highly industrialized Canada
and the United States, on the one hand, and slowly industrializing Mexico, on
the other. That puts great stress on Mexican agriculture. As one writer
explained, "Mexican farmers simply can't compete with capital-intensive
United States agribusiness, which continues to enjoy generous government
subsidies.... In 1993, more than ten million Mexicans made their living off
the land. Today, even as Mexico's population has grown, that number has
plummeted to about seven million.
42
Those millions of disemployed Mexican farmers are moving to Mexican
cities looking for jobs, and with each NAFTA "staging category" their
looking gets harder. For some U.S. agricultural goods, a complete opening on
January 1, 2008 may be more than Mexico can politically endure.
39 Dudley Althaus, Mexican President-Elect Must Ride Oil's Fortunes, Hous. CHRON.,
Oct. 1, 2006, at D1.
40 Id.
41 Luis Rubio & Jeffrey Davidow, Mexico's Disputed Election, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct.
2006, at 80.
42 Greg Grandin, How to be a Good Neighbor, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2006.
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In his campaign against Calder6n, L6pez Obrador promised that, if
elected President, L6pez Obrador would renegotiate NAFFA's free trade
opening for U.S. corn and beans. The U.S. Undersecretary of Agriculture
primly replied, "We have no interest in renegotiating any parts of the
agreement., 43 That frames the issue President Calder6n must now address.
Pressure is mounting and the clock is ticking. That key issue must be
resolved before January 1, 2008.
III. The Future of NAFTA
Do those immigration and trade-opening issues threaten the future of
NAFTA? Is it possible that a harsh U.S. anti-alien law or a rigid U.S. refusal
to postpone parts of NAFTA's final trade opening would so infuriate
Mexicans that Mexico would withdraw from NAFTA? If Mexico withdrew,
would that end NAFTA?
The answers are no. NAFTA allows a member country to leave NAFTA
easily. All it takes is six-month written notice.44 But even if Mexico left,
between Canada and the United States NAFTA would remain intact; in
NAFTA's words, "the Agreement shall remain in force for the remaining
Parties."45 The landing would be even softer than that. When NAFTA was
formed, Canada and the United States did not abolish their two-way
agreement; they merely "suspended" it, with the stipulation that it would
revive if either of them left NAFTA or NAFTA otherwise failed.46
But such pessimistic ponderings are unnecessary. However provoked,
Mexico will not leave NAFTA. Too much of Mexico's trade stability,
investment appeal, and creditworthiness depend on a continuing NAFIA
relationship. We could imagine an enraged President L6pez Obrador sending
a six-month withdrawal notice in a tantrum, but we cannot imagine that of
lawyerly, orderly President Calder6n or even his party-split Congress.
Immigration and final trade opening are not life-and-death issues for
NAFTA, but they are issues that can cause Mexico and the United States to
interact within NAFTA as antagonists or as friends.
IV. A Difficult Relationship
Those are the three key issues between Mexico and the United States
today. Resolving those issues will require strength, patience, and wisdom
43 id.
44 NAFTA, supra note, 13 at ch. 22, art. 2205.
45 Id.
46 See RALPH H. FOLSOM, NAFTA AND FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 19 (Thomson/West,
2004).
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from both sides. On immigration, the main effort must come from the United
States; resolving NAFTA's final trade opening requires cooperation from
both sides; creating coordinated energy muscle is largely up to Mexico. But
underlying all three issues are President Calder6n's three pressing problems:
gaining popular and Congressional support and moving Mexico toward more
equally shared prosperity. Those are problems that President Calder6n must
solve.
Mexican author Carlos Fuentes described the situation very clearly. "This
relationship with the United States," he wrote, "promises to be one of the
most difficult in our history because it now depends more on what we do in
Mexico than what the gringos do in the United States. 47
47 Carlos Fuentes, A New Era for Mexico, NEW PERSPECTIVES QUARTERLY, Winter 2007,
http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2007_winter/i 5_fuentes.html.
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